When do special interests run rampant? disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises
Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government de...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy
2001
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| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
2543 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
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| Zusammenfassung: | Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government decisions that benefit special interest groups, especially government decisions to deal with banking crises. He finds that the better informed the voters, the more proximate elections, and the larger the number of political veto players (conditional on the costs to voters of relevant policy decisions), the smaller the government's fiscal transfers are to the financial sector and the less likely the government is to exercise forbearance in dealing with insolvent financial institutions |
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| Beschreibung: | "February 2001"--Cover Includes bibliographical references (p. 45-47) Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 18, 2002 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |