When do special interests run rampant? disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises

Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government de...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Keefer, Philip (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Washington, D.C World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy 2001
Schriftenreihe:	Policy research working paper 2543
Schlagworte:	Banks and banking > Political aspects > Mathematical models Financial crises > Mathematical models Fiscal policy > Mathematical models
Online-Zugang:	BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 URL des Erstveröffentlichers
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