Conflict in informal rural construction land transfer practices in China: A case of Hubei

Driven by high value-added benefits as well as the less mature legal systems, informal land transfer becomes widespread in rural China. Based on Institutional Vicissitude Theory, this paper investigates the responses of local stakeholders to the process of informal rural land transfer. Case studies undertaken at Hubei province in China reveal the conflicts in informal land transfer. The article firstly reviews the China's unique dual land system and land transfer policy. It then investigates different stakeholders in the informal land transfer practices through questionnaire surveys and face-to-face interviews. We demonstrate the mechanism and interaction of different conflicts in China's informal land transfer system. Our findings also emphasize the need for informal land transfer to align with government policies and regional development plans. The implications help provide an important reference for studying informal land systems in developing countries with similar dilemma generally. •Profit-driven and profit-distribution are the root reasons for the formation of informal land transfer system.•Ambiguous rural land property rights directly lead to conflict over the distribution of interest.•Ineffective legal protection system exists in informal rural land transfer.