Die Metaphysik der menschlichen Freiheit

Schelling’s 1809 ( ), perhaps his most widely read work, presents considerable difficulties of understanding. In this paper I offer an interpretation of the work in relation to Kant. My focus is on the relation in each case of their theory of human freedom to their general metaphysics, a relation which both regard as essential. The argument of the paper is that Schelling may be viewed as addressing and resolving a problem which arises from Kant’s use of transcendental idealism to defend the possibility of human freedom, deriving from the challenge posed by Spinozism. One major innovation in Schelling’s theory of human freedom is his claim that it presupposes the reality of evil, and I argue that this thesis also provides a key to the highly original metaphysics of the . The relation of Schelling’s theory of freedom to his general metaphysics is therefore complex, for it goes in two directions: the metaphysics are not simply presupposed by the theory of freedom but are also in part derived from it. These new metaphysics also, I argue, allow Schelling to resolve a problem which his own earlier Spinozistic system had left unresolved.