DO ABATEMENT QUOTAS LEAD TO MORE SUCCESSFUL CLIMATE COALITIONS?

DO ABATEMENT QUOTAS LEAD TO MORE SUCCESSFUL CLIMATE COALITIONS?

In this paper we study the effect of different treaty designs on the success of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We analyze the standard assumption of an efficient abatement scheme and three uniform abatement quota schemes. Apart from analytical results, the analysis is supported by si...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Manchester school 2008-01, Vol.76 (1), p.104-129
Hauptverfasser: ALTAMIRANO-CABRERA, JUAN-CARLOS, FINUS, MICHAEL, DELLINK, ROB
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
agreements
Economic models
Environmental economics
global emission game
Industrial economics
International agreements
international-cooperation
Pollution control
protocol
Quotas
stability
Studies
Trade agreements
Voting behaviour
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In this paper we study the effect of different treaty designs on the success of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We analyze the standard assumption of an efficient abatement scheme and three uniform abatement quota schemes. Apart from analytical results, the analysis is supported by simulations based on the STACO (stability of coalitions) model. It turns out that quota agreements where the members decide by majority or unanimity voting are successful in overcoming free‐rider incentives within an IEA. Finally, our results provide a rationale for the application of uniform abatement quotas in IEAs.
ISSN:1463-6786
1467-9957
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01052.x