Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to Kelo
The Kelo decision provoked considerable legislative activity as 46 states adopted legislation on eminent domain in its aftermath. Only about half adopted restrictions that were more than symbolic, however. This paper examines those responses using a logistic regression analysis and finds that all el...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Supreme Court economic review 2009-02, Vol.17 (1), p.237-278 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | The Kelo decision provoked considerable legislative
activity as 46 states adopted legislation on eminent domain in its
aftermath. Only about half adopted restrictions that were more than
symbolic, however. This paper examines those responses using a logistic
regression analysis and finds that all else equal: (1) states where
legislatures were more constrained by tax and expenditure limits were
less likely to adopt substantive restrictions; (2) a larger number
of Republicans in the state legislature made a state more likely to
adopt a substantive restriction; (3) overall Republican strength (as
measured by gubinatorial elections) made states less likely to adopt
a substantive response, suggesting political competitiveness not ideology
motivated action; (4) there was no evidence that measures of an electorate’s
overall ideology (with respect to environmental, liberal, or conservative
causes) made a difference; (5) economically growing states were more
likely to adopt substantive restrictions; and (6) greater degrees
of inequality and larger African-American populations were not correlated
with the type of response. Taken together, these results suggest a
public choice model of legislative action, rather than an ideological
one, with legislatures facing other constraints (e.g. TEL and slower
growth) being less likely to give up valuable eminent domain powers
and legislatures where adoption of real reform was less costly (faster
growth) or more beneficial (more competitive political environments)
more likely to do so. |
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ISSN: | 0736-9921 2156-6208 |
DOI: | 10.1086/656057 |