Shape, Perspective, and What Is and Is Not Perceived: Comment on Morales, Bax, and Firestone (2020)

Psychology and philosophy have long reflected on the role of perspective in vision. Since the dawn of modern vision science-roughly, since Helmholtz in the late 1800s-scientific explanations in vision have focused on understanding the computations that transform the sensed retinal image into percepts of the three-dimensional environment. The standard view in the science is that distal properties-viewpoint-independent properties of the environment (object shape) and viewpoint-dependent relational properties (3D orientation relative to the viewer)-are perceptually represented and that properties of the proximal stimulus (in vision, the retinal image) are not. This view is woven into the nature of scientific explanation in perceptual psychology, and has guided impressive advances over the past 150 years. A recently published article suggests that in shape perception, the standard view must be revised. It argues, on the basis of new empirical data, that a new entity-perspectival shape-should be introduced into scientific explanations of shape perception. Specifically, the article's centrally advertised claim is that, in addition to distal shape, perspectival shape is perceived. We argue that this claim rests on a series of mistakes. Problems in experimental design entail that the article provides no empirical support for any claims regarding either perspective or the perception of shape. There are further problems in scientific reasoning and conceptual development. Detailing these criticisms and explaining how science treats these issues are meant to clarify method and theory, and to improve exchanges between the science and philosophy of perception.