Separating desire from prediction of outcome value
Motivational desires usually match predictions of outcome gain. The match is so close that some define desire as nothing more than the prediction of gain.Opposing evidence is presented here that desire is psychologically distinct from prediction and has different underlying neural mechanisms. Conseq...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Trends in cognitive sciences 2023-10, Vol.27 (10), p.932-946 |
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Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Motivational desires usually match predictions of outcome gain. The match is so close that some define desire as nothing more than the prediction of gain.Opposing evidence is presented here that desire is psychologically distinct from prediction and has different underlying neural mechanisms. Consequently, desire as incentive salience can separate completely from learned predictions, and can even create desires for outcomes that are remembered and predicted to be bad.The operating rules of incentive salience that power such desires emerge from brain mesolimbic dopamine-related systems.Two laboratory examples are described here to show how desire can separate from learned predictions of value: (i) 'wanting what is remembered to be disgusting', and (ii) 'wanting what is predicted to hurt'.In people, similar separations of motivational desire from outcome prediction can occur in addiction and related clinical conditions.
Individuals typically want what they expect to like, often based on memories of previous positive experiences. However, in some situations desire can decouple completely from memories and from learned predictions of outcome value. The potential for desire to separate from prediction arises from independent operating rules that control motivational incentive salience. Incentive salience, or 'wanting', is a type of mesolimbic desire that evolved for adaptive goals, but can also generate maladaptive addictions. Two proof-of-principle examples are presented here to show how motivational 'wanting' can soar above memory-based predictions of outcome value: (i) 'wanting what is remembered to be disgusting', and (ii) 'wanting what is predicted to hurt'. Consequently, even outcomes remembered and predicted to be negatively aversive can become positively 'wanted'. Similarly, in human addictions, people may experience powerful cue-triggered cravings for outcomes that are not predicted to be enjoyable.
Individuals typically want what they expect to like, often based on memories of previous positive experiences. However, in some situations desire can decouple completely from memories and from learned predictions of outcome value. The potential for desire to separate from prediction arises from independent operating rules that control motivational incentive salience. Incentive salience, or 'wanting', is a type of mesolimbic desire that evolved for adaptive goals, but can also generate maladaptive addictions. Two proof-of-principle examples are presented her |
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ISSN: | 1364-6613 1879-307X 1879-307X |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.tics.2023.07.007 |