Heterogeneously Networked Evolutionary Games With Intergroup Conflicts

Network games primarily explore the intricacies of individual interactions and adaptive strategies within a network. Building upon this framework, the present study delves into the modeling, analysis, and control of heterogeneously networked evolutionary games with intergroup conflict (HNEG-IC), where attacking players possess area-monitoring capabilities with limited attacking power. To begin with, a mathematical model is introduced to capture intragroup strategy dynamics and intergroup conflicts of HNEGs-IC via the algebraic state space representation (ASSR). A necessary and sufficient condition for achieving global cooperation of HNEGs-IC is established. Then, a criterion for verifying the \kappa -cooperation below a certain mortality is presented. Considering the HNEGs-IC with strategy feedback control, it is proven that the feedback control, subject to global cooperation, is robust to conflicts when the intersection of the strategy threshold set and the reachable set of the preset initial strategy profiles is empty. Finally, for verification and demonstration, the obtained results are applied to a simplified virtual game model of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact.