Are the Australian poultry industries vulnerable to large outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza

Objective  To describe the structure of the Australian poultry industry and discuss the potential for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) to spread between Australian poultry farms. Procedure  High densities of poultry farms, frequent contacts between farms by service providers, the supply of l...

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Veröffentlicht in:Australian veterinary journal 2009-05, Vol.87 (5), p.165-174
Hauptverfasser: Hamilton, S.A, East, I.J, Toribio, J.A, Garner, M.G
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Objective  To describe the structure of the Australian poultry industry and discuss the potential for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) to spread between Australian poultry farms. Procedure  High densities of poultry farms, frequent contacts between farms by service providers, the supply of live poultry markets (LPM) and the presence of free‐range duck flocks in affected regions have been identified as risk factors for the spread of HPAI between flocks in outbreaks causing the death or destruction of over 1 million poultry overseas. Data on 1,594 commercial Australian chicken meat, chicken egg, duck and turkey farms were collected by a telephone questionnaire of farm managers to assess the risk of a HPAI outbreak in Australia. Results and Discussion  Five regions of Australia had farm densities comparable to overseas regions that experienced widespread HPAI. Common service providers routinely contacted different classes and types of farms over wide geographic areas. However, no responding farms supplied LPM and the majority of duck farms did not produce free‐range ducks. Conclusion  Outbreaks of HPAI have the potential to cause serious impacts on the Australian poultry industry. The risk posted by LPM and free‐range ducks is limited, but the movement of genetic stock and common service providers could spread infection between companies, industries or geographical regions. Biosecurity measures are therefore considered critical to limit the secondary spread of infection should an outbreak occur.
ISSN:0005-0423
1751-0813
DOI:10.1111/j.1751-0813.2009.00423.x