General Nuclear Compellence: The State, Allies, and Adversaries
The study of compellence has focused on crisis situations. However, compellence may work without crises. If a state possesses the capability to compel a target, the target may choose to make concessions to avoid a crisis and dampen the risk of conflict. This constitutes a form of “general compellenc...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Strategic studies quarterly : SSQ 2019-10, Vol.13 (3), p.93-121 |
---|---|
Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | The study of compellence has focused on crisis situations. However, compellence may work without crises. If a state possesses the capability to compel a target, the target may choose to make concessions to avoid a crisis and dampen the risk of conflict. This constitutes a form of “general compellence.” As with general deterrence, failures in general compellence will result in crises. We discuss this notion of general compellence in the context of nuclear proliferation. Nuclearization may give a state greater ability to compel others by threatening nuclear escalation. This ability yields general compellence leverage vis-à-vis its allies and adversaries. Facing the risk of nuclear escalation, the state’s adversaries may offer political concessions, leading to improved relations and détente. The state’s allies may offer additional security commitments to diminish the risk that the new nuclear state will use its weapons, leading to tighter alliance relationships. We illustrate our arguments with case studies of France, China, Israel, and South Africa in the aftermath of their nuclear acquisition. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1936-1815 1936-1823 |