Conventional Arms and Nuclear Peace
What many in the arms control community fail to appreciate, understand, or adequately analyze is how conventional force imbalances play into a state's security dilemma. Conventional arms imbalances generally--and US conventional military superiority specifically--are as much potential drivers o...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Strategic Studies Quarterly 2017-04, Vol.11 (1), p.14-24 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | What many in the arms control community fail to appreciate, understand, or adequately analyze is how conventional force imbalances play into a state's security dilemma. Conventional arms imbalances generally--and US conventional military superiority specifically--are as much potential drivers of nuclear proliferation and geostrategic instability as nuclear weapons are. American preponderance in power-projection capabilities has in the past influenced some countries to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent against US intervention. National leaders are not always rational, because they do not effectively weigh costs and benefits or risks and rewards, which would lead them to overvalue the prospect of a loss and undervalue the prospect of a gain. The certain loss caused by any prospective use of nuclear weapons has caused decision makers to exercise great restraint when contemplating the prospective use of force. History appears to suggest that, to some degree, nuclear weapons do cause decision makers to see the use of nuclear weapons as ensuring losses, with few gains--causing restraint. |
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ISSN: | 1936-1815 1936-1823 |