Performance lessons

That this is not a complete aberration in the U.K. is made clear in William Finnegan's, "Letter from London" in the Feb. 9 New Yorker which deals with the attempt to privatize the London Underground and to secure accountability through performance targets. The contracts were to be output-driven or performance-based "... which meant that, in order to determine payments [to the private contractors], the contracts had to anticipate an almost infinite number of possible 'outcomes,' as well as devise formulas to measure everything from 'station ambience' to 'lost customer hours.' But the task of turning this theory into actual contracts had proved Sisyphean..." The authors conclude the merit system "... had more to do with manipulating the system than with honestly evaluating talent..." Enron's former chief financial officer, Andrew Fastow, who recently accepted a 10-year prison term and a heavy fine, "... used the semiannual Performance Review Committee to push his people ahead and buy their loyalty. Though the original purpose of the PRC had become largely perverted, most executives at least went through the motions. Fastow didn't bother." Furthermore, "... the entire process consumed huge amounts of time for everyone involved."