Structural Adjustment: Former President Ben Ali's Gift to Tunisia (Part One)

During the Ben Ali years in power (1987-2011), Tunisia was often cited as an IMF poster-child, i.e., IMF structural adjustment might have caused 'problems' elsewhere - but in Tunisia, at least according to IMF publicity, it seemed to be working. This particular illusion was blown to bits so to speak by the emergence of the massive social movement that brought down the Ben Ali government. When the mask was ripped off, it turns out that not only had IMF structural adjustment policies not helped Tunisia, they were a major contributor to the country's socio-economic crisis. IMF statistics on Tunisia were, if not entirely fabricated, way off. In retrospect, the implementation of [Zine Ben Ali]'s economic program was a classic example of what later Naomi's Klein would refer to as the 'Shock Doctrine' to the Tunisian realities. In the Ben Ali case, a political coup - that by the way included the promise of greater democracy - became the pretext for a far-reaching economic restructuring of the economy. It included classic structural adjustment themes: reducing the state sector in the economy, lifting subsidies, 'loosening' the social contract, weakening the country's education and healthcare system, keeping wages low, lifting capital controls, privatization of state resources, etc., etc. - all the policies that have made IMF structural adjustment the antithesis of Third World development over the past thirty years. It all happened quickly before the Tunisian public understood the degree to which their lives were about to be changed. It was not only that subsidies would be ended and much of the country's state-owned economic structures be privatized, the country's entire economic model that had existed since independence was dismantled in the process. The 'old authoritarian' economic model instituted by [Habib Bourguiba] that included state involvement in the economy, a social contract that included subsidies on basic needs, free quality education and a somewhat protectionist approach to foreign investment and involvement in the country's affairs, came unglued. In its place 'a new authoritarian' model based upon classic neoliberal economic principles was immediately and aggressively implemented before the Tunisian people could fathom what was going on.[vi]