Strategic complementarities and nested potential games
This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno [Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1–8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player.
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of mathematical economics 2011-12, Vol.47 (6), p.728-732 |
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| container_end_page | 732 |
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| container_issue | 6 |
| container_start_page | 728 |
| container_title | Journal of mathematical economics |
| container_volume | 47 |
| creator | Uno, Hiroshi |
| description | This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno [Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1–8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.002 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of mathematical economics, 2011-12, Vol.47 (6), p.728-732 |
| issn | 0304-4068 |
| language | eng |
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| source | RePEc; ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Economic behaviour Economic theory Enterprise games Existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium Game theory Games Microeconomics Nash equilibrium Potential games Strategic complementarities Strategic complementarities Potential games Existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium Strategic studies |
| title | Strategic complementarities and nested potential games |
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