Strategic complementarities and nested potential games

This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno [Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1–8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player.

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of mathematical economics 2011-12, Vol.47 (6), p.728-732
1. Verfasser: Uno, Hiroshi
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno [Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1–8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player.
ISSN:0304-4068
DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.002