Cartel detection: Is market share volatility a significant indicator?

In this short paper, cartel behaviour is analysed with respect to the market shares of cartel members. There is some evidence in previous theoretical and empirical research that market shares under collusion are more stable than in phases of competition. It is shown that this can be an artifact and...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Inter economics 2011-08, Vol.46 (4), p.217-221
Hauptverfasser: Geist, Alexander, von Blanckenburg, Korbinian
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In this short paper, cartel behaviour is analysed with respect to the market shares of cartel members. There is some evidence in previous theoretical and empirical research that market shares under collusion are more stable than in phases of competition. It is shown that this can be an artifact and that market share volatility may not be used by antitrust authorities as an exclusive indicator of tacit collusion. Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the distribution of market share changes during both the competitive and the collusive phases of ten recently discovered conspiracies is compared. Only in 3 of the 10 cartels were the distributions of market share changes significantly different.
ISSN:1613-964X
0020-5346
1613-964X
DOI:10.1007/s10272-011-0386-3