Trust games: A meta-analysis
► Data are aggregated from 162 trust games involving over 23,000 participants. ► Subjects playing for random payments, playing with a simulated counterpart, or playing in Africa send less in the trust game. ► Receivers who are students, playing both roles, or playing the game with a lower multiplier...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic psychology 2011-10, Vol.32 (5), p.865-889 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | ► Data are aggregated from 162 trust games involving over 23,000 participants. ► Subjects playing for random payments, playing with a simulated counterpart, or playing in Africa send less in the trust game. ► Receivers who are students, playing both roles, or playing the game with a lower multiplier send back less. ► We find no significant impact of the double blind protocol on behavior.
We collect data from 162 replications of the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe Investment game (the “trust” game) involving more than 23,000 participants. We conduct a meta-analysis of these games in order to identify the effect of experimental protocols and geographic variation on this popular behavioral measure of trust and trustworthiness. Our findings indicate that the amount sent in the game is significantly affected by whether payment is random, and whether play is with a simulated counterpart. Trustworthiness is significantly affected by the amount by which the experimenter multiplies the amount sent, whether subjects play both roles in the experiment, and whether the subjects are students. We find robust evidence that subjects send less in trust games conducted in Africa than those in North America. |
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ISSN: | 0167-4870 1872-7719 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.007 |