Coalitional stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems

Özkal-Sanver (Theory Decis 59:193–205, 2005) studies stability and efficiency of partitions of agents in two-sided matching markets in which agents can form partitions by individual moves only, and a matching rule determines the matching in each coalition in a partition. In this study, we present th...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Theory and decision 2011-09, Vol.71 (3), p.395-407
Hauptverfasser:	Nizamogullari, Duygu, Özkal-Sanver, İpek
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agency Applied sciences Associations Behavioral/Experimental Economics Coalitions Codes Decision making Decision theory Decision theory. Utility theory Determinants Economic efficiency Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Exact sciences and technology Finance Flows in networks. Combinatorial problems Game Theory Group dynamics Group membership Insurance Management Markets Matching Operational research and scientific management Operational research. Management science Operations Research/Decision Theory Pareto optimum Partition Partitions Preferences Property rights Social and Behav. Sciences Society Stability Statistics for Business Studies
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Zusammenfassung:	Özkal-Sanver (Theory Decis 59:193–205, 2005) studies stability and efficiency of partitions of agents in two-sided matching markets in which agents can form partitions by individual moves only, and a matching rule determines the matching in each coalition in a partition. In this study, we present the relationship between stability and efficiency of partitions that is analyzed for several matching rules and under various membership property rights codes, now allowing coalitional moves.
ISSN:	0040-5833 1573-7187
DOI:	10.1007/s11238-010-9204-9