The reasoning-based expected utility procedure
This paper presents a new iterative procedure for solving finite non-cooperative games, the reasoning-based expected utility procedure (RBEU), and compares this with existing iterative procedures. RBEU deletes more strategies than iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, while avoiding th...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Games and economic behavior 2011-03, Vol.71 (2), p.328-338 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | This paper presents a new iterative procedure for solving finite non-cooperative games, the
reasoning-based expected utility procedure (RBEU), and compares this with existing iterative procedures. RBEU deletes more strategies than iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, while avoiding the conceptual problems associated with iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. It uses a sequence of “accumulation” and “deletion” operations to categorise strategies as permissible and impermissible; strategies may remain uncategorised when the procedure halts. RBEU and related “categorisation procedures” can be interpreted as tracking successive steps in players' own reasoning. |
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ISSN: | 0899-8256 1090-2473 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.002 |