The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure

The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure

In this essay I present a new version of the Paradox of the Knower and show that this new paradox vitiates a certain argument against epistemic closure. I then prove a theorem that relates the new paradox to epistemological scepticism. I conclude by assessing the use of the Knower in arguments again...

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Veröffentlicht in:Mind 2001-04, Vol.110 (438), p.319-333
1. Verfasser: Cross, Charles B.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Derivability
Epistemology
Logical theorems
Paradoxes
Predicates
Provability logic
Skepticism
Syntactic theory
Syntactics
Truth
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Zusammenfassung:In this essay I present a new version of the Paradox of the Knower and show that this new paradox vitiates a certain argument against epistemic closure. I then prove a theorem that relates the new paradox to epistemological scepticism. I conclude by assessing the use of the Knower in arguments against syntactical treatments of knowledge.
ISSN:0026-4423
1460-2113
DOI:10.1093/mind/110.438.319