Convention T Regained

Davidson's use of Tarski's Convention T as part of a truth definition for natural language is defended against counterexamples offered by J. Hintikka. The alleged counterexamples are sentences beginning with "any" whose logical form is altered when placed in the context of a T-se...

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Veröffentlicht in:Philosophical studies 1977-11, Vol.32 (4), p.377-381
1. Verfasser: Klagge, James C.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Davidson's use of Tarski's Convention T as part of a truth definition for natural language is defended against counterexamples offered by J. Hintikka. The alleged counterexamples are sentences beginning with "any" whose logical form is altered when placed in the context of a T-sentence. It is shown how a metalang can be selected so that this problem of context dependence does not arise. Finally, it is shown how Hintikka's sentences can be changed so that they resist automatic translation into their Davidsonian logical form. AA
ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/BF00368692