Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring

We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Games and economic behavior 2011, Vol.71 (1), p.174-192
Hauptverfasser: Mailath, George J., Olszewski, Wojciech
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost-public monitoring. That is, the same specification of behavior continues to be an equilibrium when the monitoring is perturbed from perfect to highly-correlated private. ► The perfect-monitoring folk theorem holds strategies are required to have bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. ► The perfect monitoring folk theorem is behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost-public monitoring. ► The same specification of behavior continues to be an equilibrium when the monitoring is perturbed from perfect to highly-correlated private.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.002