Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Games and economic behavior 2011, Vol.71 (1), p.174-192 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be
behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost-public monitoring. That is, the
same specification of behavior continues to be an equilibrium when the monitoring is perturbed from perfect to highly-correlated private.
► The perfect-monitoring folk theorem holds strategies are required to have bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. ► The perfect monitoring folk theorem is behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost-public monitoring. ► The same specification of behavior continues to be an equilibrium when the monitoring is perturbed from perfect to highly-correlated private. |
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ISSN: | 0899-8256 1090-2473 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.002 |