A Continuous Dual-Process Model of Remember/Know Judgments

The dual-process theory of recognition memory holds that recognition decisions can be based on recollection or familiarity, and the remember/know procedure is widely used to investigate those 2 processes. Dual-process theory in general and the remember/know procedure in particular have been challeng...

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Veröffentlicht in:Psychological review 2010-10, Vol.117 (4), p.1025-1054
Hauptverfasser: Wixted, John T, Mickes, Laura
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:The dual-process theory of recognition memory holds that recognition decisions can be based on recollection or familiarity, and the remember/know procedure is widely used to investigate those 2 processes. Dual-process theory in general and the remember/know procedure in particular have been challenged by an alternative strength-based interpretation based on signal-detection theory, which holds that remember judgments simply reflect stronger memories than do know judgments. Although supported by a considerable body of research, the signal-detection account is difficult to reconcile with G. Mandler's (1980) classic "butcher-on-the-bus" phenomenon (i.e., strong, familiarity-based recognition). In this article, a new signal-detection model is proposed that does not deny either the validity of dual-process theory or the possibility that remember/know judgments can--when used in the right way--help to distinguish between memories that are largely recollection based from those that are largely familiarity based. It does, however, agree with all prior signal-detection-based critiques of the remember/know procedure, which hold that, as it is ordinarily used, the procedure mainly distinguishes strong memories from weak memories (not recollection from familiarity). (Contains 2 footnotes, 3 tables, and 14 figures.)
ISSN:0033-295X
1939-1471
DOI:10.1037/a0020874