Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial

Although trial is often celebrated as the centerpiece of the US system of justice, it is not only an uncommon method of resolving disputes, but also a disfavored one. Most legal scholars, along with judges and attorneys, agree that pretrial settlement is always cheaper, faster, and better than trial...

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Veröffentlicht in:Michigan law review 1991-11, Vol.90 (2), p.319-393
Hauptverfasser: Gross, Samuel R., Syverud, Kent D.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Although trial is often celebrated as the centerpiece of the US system of justice, it is not only an uncommon method of resolving disputes, but also a disfavored one. Most legal scholars, along with judges and attorneys, agree that pretrial settlement is always cheaper, faster, and better than trial. The nature of the civil process drives parties to settle so as to avoid the costs, delays, and uncertainties of trial. Trials occur because one person has said no to a settlement offer. A statewide report of 529 civil jury trials, conducted in California State Superior Courts between June 1985 and June 1986, includes information on settlement negotiations. An attempt is made to learn something about how pretrial bargaining works by examining cases where it did not work.
ISSN:0026-2234
1939-8557
DOI:10.2307/1289558