Oligarchy and Leadership Stability: The French Communist, Socialist, and Gaullist Parties

What is the relationship between the length of tenure in office of a political party's leaders and the way in which that party is governed? The oligarchy thesis presented by Roberto Michels and further developed by Maurice Duverger suggests that within "democratic organizations" there...

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Veröffentlicht in:American journal of political science 1981-05, Vol.25 (2), p.215-240
1. Verfasser: Schonfeld, William R.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:What is the relationship between the length of tenure in office of a political party's leaders and the way in which that party is governed? The oligarchy thesis presented by Roberto Michels and further developed by Maurice Duverger suggests that within "democratic organizations" there is very great personnel stability. Data on the evolving composition of the French Communist, Socialist, and Gaullist parties do not support this argument. A more general theoretical statement is developed and then tested: leadership stability seems to vary between organizations having oligarchic as compared to monocratic forms of governance.
ISSN:0092-5853
1540-5907
DOI:10.2307/2110850