Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives

The authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism. Their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives. Market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from b...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of economic perspectives 1997-10, Vol.11 (4), p.83-92
Hauptverfasser: Qian, Yingyi, Weingast, Barry R
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:The authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism. Their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives. Market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures. The salient features of federalism--decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition--help provide credible commitment or these purposes. In addition, the authors suggest that some federalism are self-sustaining.
ISSN:0895-3309
1944-7965
DOI:10.1257/jep.11.4.83