An equilibrium search-matching model of discrimination

An equilibrium search-matching model of discrimination

A model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome, even if no agents have a taste for discrimination and groups are ex ante identical. Groups which are discriminated against (e.g., blacks, w...

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Veröffentlicht in:European economic review 1997-08, Vol.41 (8), p.1589-1613
1. Verfasser: Rosen, Asa
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Discrimination
Economic models
Employment
Employment discrimination
Employment policy
Equilibrium
Equilibrium models
Imperfect information
Information
Market equilibrium
Matching
Private information
Racial discrimination
Search
Sex discrimination
Studies
Unemployment
Wage differential
Workers
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Zusammenfassung:A model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome, even if no agents have a taste for discrimination and groups are ex ante identical. Groups which are discriminated against (e.g., blacks, women) earn lower wages, and endure longer unemployment spells.
ISSN:0014-2921
1873-572X
DOI:10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00024-4