License to Nullify: The Democratic and Constitutional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking
Since the US Supreme Court's decision in Sparf v. US (1895), it has been a commonplace understanding that criminal juries have the power but not the right to nullify the law before them, either choosing to acquit or convict when they believe the law to require otherwise. There is a burgeoning g...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Yale law journal 1997-06, Vol.106 (8), p.2563-2597 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Since the US Supreme Court's decision in Sparf v. US (1895), it has been a commonplace understanding that criminal juries have the power but not the right to nullify the law before them, either choosing to acquit or convict when they believe the law to require otherwise. There is a burgeoning grass-roots political movement to inform jurors of their power to nullify. However, as the Sparf court noted, the power to nullify does not translate into a right. It is argued that legislative attempts to authorize criminal juries to nullify the law conflict with democratic and constitutional norms. |
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ISSN: | 0044-0094 1939-8611 |
DOI: | 10.2307/797227 |