Law's Allure and the Power of Path-Dependent Legal Ideas

Gordon Silverstein's Law's Allure (2009) advances a two-part thesis on the power of legal ideas. The first is that legal precedents establish the ideological baselines on which legisfotive and bureaucratic policies are developed. Silverstein amply demonstrates the validity of this thesis. The second is that by establishing ideological baselines, legal precedents contribute to a version of path dependency (or the idea that early choices determine long-term developments) that is significantly more constraining than other forms of institutional entrenchment. Put simply, law shackles creativity in politics. This thesis I do not find persuasive, in part because Silverstein offers little evidence for it and in part because a growing body of literature suggests the contrary: the crossfertilization of ideas from one field to another—law to politics, for instance—conmbutes to, rather than retards, creative change. Nonetheless, while its broader ambitions are not satisfied, Law's Allure's narrow thesis—that precedent profoundly shapes policy development—is important and worthy of a major book in itself.