At What Cost? The Political Economy of Transitional Justice

Transitional justice mechanisms, specifically trials, truth commissions, and amnesties to deal with past state-sponsored violence, have proliferated throughout the world since the mid-1970s. While a well-developed scholarly literature corresponds to these global practices, the political economy of transitional justice remains understudied by scholars and practitioners. Drawing on the Transitional Justice Data Base, this essay tests the existing assumptions concerning the political economy of transitional justice in the literature. Specifically, are democratic leaders less likely to adopt costly transitional justice mechanisms rather than cheaper ones in countries that face economic constraints? Or, will transitional justice choices depend not on domestic economic issues, but rather on international pressure to comply with an accountability norm? Our findings highlight the sets of political economy trade-offs that new democracies face in balancing the pressures of the domestic economy and international norms. We conclude that a political economy of transitional justice exists and that a country's economic health shapes its transitional justice choices.