Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty

Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty

We investigate the value of delaying the punishment in private monitoring repeated games with almost-public information when players use a grim trigger strategy. If the effects of uncertainty and irreversibility are considered, the equilibrium set would change.

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Economics letters 2010-09, Vol.108 (3), p.337-340
1. Verfasser: Takizawa, Shinichiro
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Decision making
Decisions under uncertainty
Game theory
Information
Irreversibility
Monitoring
Private information
Private information Repeated games Decisions under uncertainty Irreversibility Trigger strategy
Repeated games
Trigger strategy
Uncertainty
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We investigate the value of delaying the punishment in private monitoring repeated games with almost-public information when players use a grim trigger strategy. If the effects of uncertainty and irreversibility are considered, the equilibrium set would change.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.023