Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents

We consider a class of mechanism games in which there are multiple principals and three or more agents. For a mechanism game in this class, a sort of folk theorem holds: there is a threshold value for each of the principals such that an allocation is achieved at a pure-strategy sequential equilibriu...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Econometrica 2010-03, Vol.78 (2), p.791-801
1. Verfasser:	Yamashita, Takuro
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agency theory Allocations Applications Collusion common agency Economic commitments Economic incentives Economic models Economic theory Exact sciences and technology Expected utility folk theorem Game theory Insurance, economics, finance Mathematics Mechanism design Nash equilibrium NOTES AND COMMENTS Printing Probability and statistics Probability theory and stochastic processes Recommendations revelation principle Sciences and techniques of general use Special processes (renewal theory, markov renewal processes, semi-markov processes, statistical mechanics type models, applications) Statistics Studies Utility functions
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	We consider a class of mechanism games in which there are multiple principals and three or more agents. For a mechanism game in this class, a sort of folk theorem holds: there is a threshold value for each of the principals such that an allocation is achieved at a pure-strategy sequential equilibrium of the game if and only if (i) it is incentive compatible and (ii) it attains an expected utility for each principal that is greater than or equal to the threshold value for the principal.
ISSN:	0012-9682 1468-0262
DOI:	10.3982/ECTA7005