Toward a general theory of constitutional personhood: a theory of constitutional personhood for transgenic humanoid species
Current law allows patents for genetically-engineered animals, but not for human beings. The 13th Amendment forbids any grant of property rights in a human being. However, within 10 to 30 years, advances in genetic engineering technology should allow scientists to intermingle the genetic material of...
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Veröffentlicht in: | UCLA law review 1992-06, Vol.39 (5), p.1425-1510 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Current law allows patents for genetically-engineered animals, but not for human beings. The 13th Amendment forbids any grant of property rights in a human being. However, within 10 to 30 years, advances in genetic engineering technology should allow scientists to intermingle the genetic material of humans and animals to produce human-animal hybrids. It may be possible to patent and to enslave human-animal hybrids who think and feel like humans but who lack constitutional protection under the 13th Amendment. It is argued that some human-animal hybrids should be protected by the US Constitution as constitutional persons. The courts should now begin to develop a legal theory of constitutional personhood that can be applied to genetically-engineered species. When applied to current legal problems and compared with present law, the personhood presumption theory seems to accord well with the existing law of constitutional personhood. It also solves many difficulties the Supreme Court has encountered with its results-oriented approach. |
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ISSN: | 0041-5650 1943-1724 |