Right to die
The idea that the right to life is a right to life of a certain minimum quality implies that mere existence is not an automatic good. Since illness, permanent injury, and dying are states of living, an individual's rights are fully engaged in them. [...]there is no difference between them; for...
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Veröffentlicht in: | BMJ 2005-04, Vol.330 (7495), p.799-799 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | The idea that the right to life is a right to life of a certain minimum quality implies that mere existence is not an automatic good. Since illness, permanent injury, and dying are states of living, an individual's rights are fully engaged in them. [...]there is no difference between them; for withholding treatment is an act, based on a decision, just as giving treatment is an act, based on a decision. [...]someone who starved another person to death would be as liable for murder as if he or she had poisoned the person. |
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ISSN: | 0959-8138 1468-5833 1756-1833 |
DOI: | 10.1136/bmj.330.7495.799 |