Shifted deductibles for high risks: More effective in reducing moral hazard than traditional deductibles
In health insurance, a traditional deductible (i.e. with a deductible range [0, d]) is in theory not effective in reducing moral hazard for individuals who know (ex-ante) that their expenditures will exceed the deductible amount d, e.g. those with a chronic disease. To increase the effectiveness, th...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of health economics 2009, Vol.28 (1), p.198-209 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | In health insurance, a traditional deductible (i.e. with a deductible range [0,
d]) is in theory not effective in reducing moral hazard for individuals who know (ex-ante) that their expenditures will exceed the deductible amount
d, e.g. those with a chronic disease. To increase the effectiveness, this paper proposes to shift the deductible range to [
s
i
,
s
i
+
d], with starting point
s
i
depending on relevant risk characteristics of individual
i. In an empirical illustration we assume the optimal shift to be such that the variance in out-of-pocket expenditures is maximized. Results indicate that for the 10-percent highest risks in our data the optimal starting point of a €1000-deductible is to be found (far) beyond €1200, which corresponds with a deductible range of [1200,2200] or further. We conclude that, compared to traditional deductibles, shifted deductibles with a risk-adjusted starting point lower out-of-pocket expenditures and may further reduce moral hazard. |
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ISSN: | 0167-6296 1879-1646 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.09.007 |