Ideological Extremism and Public Participation

Objectives. Does aggregate ideological extremism reduce public participation? Does participation in governance processes fall when the social environment shifts to the extreme left or the extreme right of the political spectrum? Our main hypothesis is that the aggregate ideological orientation of th...

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Veröffentlicht in:Social science quarterly 2006-03, Vol.87 (1), p.36-54
Hauptverfasser: Whitford, Andrew B., Yates, Jeff, Ochs, Holona L.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Objectives. Does aggregate ideological extremism reduce public participation? Does participation in governance processes fall when the social environment shifts to the extreme left or the extreme right of the political spectrum? Our main hypothesis is that the aggregate ideological orientation of the social environment constrains volunteerism in social regulatory programs. Methods. We test our hypothesis using a panel tobit analysis of data from the federal Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program. Results. Our model of public participation (expressed as volunteerism) shows that participation expands when the ideological position of a state's citizens is at the extreme left or right of the political continuum. We show the differential effects of two types of aggregate ideological orientation: of citizens and their political leaders. We further find that participation is greatest in states with extremely liberal citizen ideological positions. Conclusions. These findings paint a more complex picture of the effect of extremism in the social environment on public participation measured as production volunteerism. In sum, public participation is greatest when the social environment is ideologically polarized, and social regulation is strongest when volunteerism is greatest.
ISSN:0038-4941
1540-6237
DOI:10.1111/j.0038-4941.2006.00367.x