Organization of the Health Insurance System in Argentina. Analysis and Proposal for Reform

Problems associated with incentives in each of the three segments of the health care market in Argentina are analyzed. Overall, the public health system is inefficiently managed & lacks clear objectives. By the very nature of the health sector, certain characteristics -- asymmetry of information, moral chance, the difficulty in evaluating the quality of care delivered & in defining the need for treatment -- create incentives for overconsumption & overtreating, both of which result in higher costs. In the area of health insurance for employees, the beneficiary's obligation to belong to a predetermined entity (the workplace) absolutely elminates competition in this segment; high costs & poor management are the result. Private health insurance is even more costly, & inaccessible to a large % of the population, even while coverage of catastrophic health events presents difficulties. An alternative health insurance model is proposed that reforms the public health segment & integrates it into the whole system. The plan contains a provision for the accumulation of health insurance toward retirement. 6 Tables, 6 Figures, 21 References. Adapted from the source document.