FROM CONSENSUS TO CONSENT: A Plea for a More Communicative Ethic

In a proposal for a revised communicative ethic, John Rawls's liberalist theory of theological ethics & Jurgen Habermas's universalist theory of moral philosophy are critiqued as proceduralist approaches that do not permit the communication of different conceptions of the good. This shortcoming stems from key assumptions held in each theory: specifically, the assumptions that consensus is crucial to valid ethical norms (religious or philosophical) for public life, but that agreement about them is either impossible (in the case of Rawls) or possible only under very specific conditions (for Habermas), limit the scope of a public discourse toward the establishment of a concept of the good. Drawing from Seyla Benhabib's criticism of Habermas, & the writings of Josiah Royce & H. Richard Niebuhr, it is argued that such a dialogue in an atmosphere of radical pluralism & diversity need not arrive at agreement. The very act of parties in dialogue articulating radically different conceptions of good may serve to mutually correct or complement their positions, & enrich their future experiences. 36 References. J. Sadler