Rent-Seeking with Multiple Winners

Rent-Seeking with Multiple Winners

This paper examines the impact of the number of winners allowed by regulators on rentseeking expenditures. It is demonstrated in a widely used model that an increase in the number of winners will decrease total rent-seeking expenditures. This result is generally obtained regardless of whether the fi...

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Veröffentlicht in:Public choice 1993-10, Vol.77 (2), p.437-443
1. Verfasser: Berry, S. Keith
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Economic models
Economic rent
Economic Theory
Expected utility
Expenditures
Games
Monopoly
Probability distributions
Profits
Regulation
Rent seeking behavior
Rent-seeking
Utility functions
Welfare losses
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Zusammenfassung:This paper examines the impact of the number of winners allowed by regulators on rentseeking expenditures. It is demonstrated in a widely used model that an increase in the number of winners will decrease total rent-seeking expenditures. This result is generally obtained regardless of whether the firms are risk-averse or risk-lovers. When regulators award coveted market franchises, there will be smaller welfare losses if more winners are allowed.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/BF01047881