Socratic Virtue in Post-Modernity: The Importance of Philosophy for Liberalism

Theory: Rorty argues that liberals can forsake philosophic guidance and accept the historical character of the self and truth without sacrificing traditional, communal respect for the "Socratic virtues" of talking, listening, and deliberating in common. Argument: According to Nietzsche, however, insights into the historical character of the self and truth call for overturning democratic morality and establishing radical aristocracy. On inspection, Rorty's arguments suggest that he does not think that philosophy is impossible or arbitrary, but that he suspects that Nietzsche has recognized something about the self that is inimical to liberalism and democracy. Consequently, Rorty advocates sequestering philosophy from politics and promoting philosophic light-mindedness and "bourgeois" culture lest more "serious" inquiries and passionate hopes undermine the relative toleration and tranquillity we enjoy. But this solution leaves liberalism in a vulnerable position. Conclusion: In order to deepen our respect for "Socratic virtues," it may be useful to reconsider whether Plato's original account of Socrates can help us identify lasting, intelligible, human needs and reawaken admiration for Socrates' way of life.