Moral Deliberation, Nonmoral Ends, and the Virtuous Agent

Isaacs and Jeske argue that a realistic picture of moral deliberation does not give rise to the worries that previous critics have raised. They suggest that the ideal moral agent can be noninstrumentally committed to many nonmoral goods and to many moral goods for other than moral reasons.

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Ethics 1997-04, Vol.107 (3), p.486-500
Hauptverfasser:	Isaacs, Tracy, Jeske, Diane
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Consequentialism Ethics Friendship Impartiality Moral agency Moral character Morality Morals Philosophy Philosophy of action Pure reason Running Theory of values and moral philosophy. Philosophy of action Virtue Zoos
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	Isaacs and Jeske argue that a realistic picture of moral deliberation does not give rise to the worries that previous critics have raised. They suggest that the ideal moral agent can be noninstrumentally committed to many nonmoral goods and to many moral goods for other than moral reasons.
ISSN:	0014-1704 1539-297X
DOI:	10.1086/233746