Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil
Brazilian presidents have had considerable success in getting their agendas approved in the congress, contrary to the conventional wisdom regarding the functioning of the Brazilian multiparty presidential system. They have succeeded by relying on the support of disciplined parties. The agenda powers...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Comparative politics 2000-01, Vol.32 (2), p.151-170 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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Zusammenfassung: | Brazilian presidents have had considerable success in getting their agendas approved in the congress, contrary to the conventional wisdom regarding the functioning of the Brazilian multiparty presidential system. They have succeeded by relying on the support of disciplined parties. The agenda powers held by the president and party leaders allow them to neutralize the personal vote and to obtain disciplined political support. An analysis of legislative output and roll call votes supports these conclusions. |
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ISSN: | 0010-4159 2151-6227 |
DOI: | 10.2307/422395 |