Coercive Capability in Conflict: A Test of Bilateral Deterrence Versus Conflict Spiral Theory

This research investigates how the magnitude of coercive power capability affects the use of punitive tactics in an explicit bargaining context. Two theories offer contradictory predictions for equal and unequal power situations. Bilateral deterrence theory predicts that when actors have equal power, higher levels of coercive capability will reduce the frequency of punitive tactics; conflict spiral theory predicts that higher levels of coercive capability will increase the frequency of punitive tactics. Comparing equal with unequal power relationships, bilateral deterrence predicts further that actors will use more punitive tactics under conditions of unequal power, while conflict spiral predicts that they will use fewer punitive tactics under such conditions. These predictions were tested in a two-party bargaining setting which manipulated the magnitude of coercive power available to actors and which allowed them to exchange offers and administer threats and punishments to one another. The results of two experiments support bilateral deterrence theory and generally contradict conflict spiral theory.