Translation, Interpretation and Understanding

A distinction is made between translation & interpretation, &, using anthropological examples, it is argued that alternative conceptual schemes not translatable into English can be understood through interpretation. Donald Davidson's argument ("On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Sche...

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Veröffentlicht in:Philosophy of the social sciences 1988-09, Vol.18 (3), p.343-353
1. Verfasser: Jennings, Richard C.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:A distinction is made between translation & interpretation, &, using anthropological examples, it is argued that alternative conceptual schemes not translatable into English can be understood through interpretation. Donald Davidson's argument ("On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1973/74, 47, 5-20) that we cannot speak intelligibly of different conceptual schemes is refuted on the grounds that understanding does not require translation. Also, a line of argument based on Davidson's reasoning, which attempts to establish that our criteria of rationality must be universal is considered. It is argued that rationality is relative to conceptual schemes, & that there are alternative criteria of rationality; ie, rationality is relative. AA
ISSN:0048-3931
1552-7441
DOI:10.1177/004839318801800303