Majority Opinion Assignments and the Maintenance of the Original Coalition on the Warren Court
Conventional wisdom about the U.S. Supreme Court states that assignment of the majority opinion to the marginal member of the minimum winning original coalition might ensure its survival. Insofar as minimum winning original coalitions on the Warren Court are concerned (which original coalitions were...
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Veröffentlicht in: | American journal of political science 1988-02, Vol.32 (1), p.72-81 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Conventional wisdom about the U.S. Supreme Court states that assignment of the majority opinion to the marginal member of the minimum winning original coalition might ensure its survival. Insofar as minimum winning original coalitions on the Warren Court are concerned (which original coalitions were identified by reference to the justices' docket books), the conventional wisdom is wrong. Although the marginal justice is substantially advantaged in opinion assignment, coalition maintenance is not thereby enhanced. Indeed, the breakup of such coalitions disproportionately occurs when the marginal justice switches his vote to the other side. Moreover, when he changes sides, he nonetheless retains the majority opinion. Assignment of the majority opinion to original coalition members other than the marginal justice did not foster the original coalition's survival either. |
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ISSN: | 0092-5853 1540-5907 |
DOI: | 10.2307/2111310 |