Lindahl Mechanisms and Free Riders
Several authors have proposed mechanisms whose Nash-equilibria yield Lindahl tax allocations; however, as is well known, so does the Lindahl procedure with an auctioneer. Moreover, the game forms of all these mechanisms, and of any as yet undiscovered such mechanism, all have the same normal form as...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Public choice 1994-07, Vol.80 (1/2), p.35-39 |
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| container_title | Public choice |
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| creator | Bailey, Martin J. |
| description | Several authors have proposed mechanisms whose Nash-equilibria yield Lindahl tax allocations; however, as is well known, so does the Lindahl procedure with an auctioneer. Moreover, the game forms of all these mechanisms, and of any as yet undiscovered such mechanism, all have the same normal form as does the Lindahl procedure without an auctioneer. The manipulative Nash equilibria are consequently the same for all these mechanisms, so that all have the traditional free-rider problem and all have the same outcome under strategic behavior. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/BF01047945 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0048-5829 |
| ispartof | Public choice, 1994-07, Vol.80 (1/2), p.35-39 |
| issn | 0048-5829 1573-7101 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_60903863 |
| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Auctioneers Diminishing marginal utility Economic Policy (Lindahl) Equilibrium Free rider effect Game theory Nash equilibrium Pareto optimum Payoff matrix Private goods Property taxes Public good Public goods Public Policy Revenue sharing Tax allocation Taxes Utility functions |
| title | Lindahl Mechanisms and Free Riders |
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