Lindahl Mechanisms and Free Riders

Several authors have proposed mechanisms whose Nash-equilibria yield Lindahl tax allocations; however, as is well known, so does the Lindahl procedure with an auctioneer. Moreover, the game forms of all these mechanisms, and of any as yet undiscovered such mechanism, all have the same normal form as...

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Veröffentlicht in:Public choice 1994-07, Vol.80 (1/2), p.35-39
1. Verfasser: Bailey, Martin J.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:Several authors have proposed mechanisms whose Nash-equilibria yield Lindahl tax allocations; however, as is well known, so does the Lindahl procedure with an auctioneer. Moreover, the game forms of all these mechanisms, and of any as yet undiscovered such mechanism, all have the same normal form as does the Lindahl procedure without an auctioneer. The manipulative Nash equilibria are consequently the same for all these mechanisms, so that all have the traditional free-rider problem and all have the same outcome under strategic behavior.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/BF01047945