Justice as Something Else

It is argued that nearly all current normative theories of distribution represent justice as something else. One is led to see justice as fairness, as the greatest mutual advantage, as the minimax relative concession, as reciprocity, as the terms of a society-wide agreement that cannot reasonably be rejected, as reversibility, as impartiality. Arguably, Kant has set the precedent. His categorical imperative identified justice as universalizability. However, universalizability is incapable of generating rules of distribution that systematically favor the weak, the unsuccessful, and the poor. The strong, the successful, and the rich cannot plausibly be held to wish redistributive rules to apply to themselves that would predictably work to their disadvantage. The concept of justice as something else, the social choice theory, and the Lockean proviso that "enough and as good" must be left for others to appropriate are discussed.