Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections

This study seeks to explain why some incumbents attract politically experienced, well-financed challengers while others do not. Using data from contested House races in 1980, we analyze the effects of four sets of variables including: (1) incumbents’ policy and nonpolicy behavior (ideological discre...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of politics 1985-05, Vol.47 (2), p.510-529
Hauptverfasser: Bond, Jon R., Covington, Cary, Fleisher, Richard
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:This study seeks to explain why some incumbents attract politically experienced, well-financed challengers while others do not. Using data from contested House races in 1980, we analyze the effects of four sets of variables including: (1) incumbents’ policy and nonpolicy behavior (ideological discrepancy and use of “perks” for advertising and casework); (2) local partisan conditions (previous vote margin and the normal partisan vote in the district); (3) district diversity; and (4) the national tide. We find that both short-term and long-term partisan forces (previous vote and normal vote), national tides, and policymaking behavior (ideological discrepancy) significantly affect the probability of attracting politically experienced, well-financed challengers. District diversity and incumbents’ use of “perks’ available for advertising and casework, on the other hand, are not related to any indicator of challenger quality.
ISSN:0022-3816
1468-2508
DOI:10.2307/2130894